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Abstract. In evolutionary robotics, as in the animal world, performing
a task which is beneficial to the entire group demands the coordination
of different individuals. Whenever time-dependent dynamic allocation of
roles is needed and individual roles are not pre-defined, coordination can
often be hard to achieve. In this paper, we study the evolution of role
allocation and self-assembling strategies in a group of two homogeneous
robots. We show how robot coordination and individual choices (who will
grip whom) can be successfully restated in terms of anti-coordination
problems, showing how conventional game theoretical tools can be used
in the interpretation and design of evolutionary outcomes in collective
robotics. Moreover, we highlight and discuss striking similarities between
the way our physical robots allocate roles and the way animals solve
conflicts. Arguably, these similarities suggest that evolutionary robotics
may offer apart from automatic controller design for autonomous robots
a viable alternative for the study of biological phenomena.
Key words: anti-coordination game, evolutionary robotics, collective
behavior, evolutionary game theory
1 Introduction
Robotics has largely drawn inspiration in the past decades from biology. Bio-
inspired robotics refers to mimicking natural mechanisms at the hardware or
the collective behaviour level. For example, social insects have often served as
a source of inspiration for research on self-organized cooperative exploration in
groups of robots using swarm intelligence techniques. Recently, the influence
arrow that links biology to robotics has become bi-directional, as roboticists
are implicitly or explicitly trying to answer questions related to biology, and in
particular animal behaviour. This is because “robots can be used as models of
specific animal systems to test hypotheses regarding the control of behaviour” [27].
Our view is that Evolutionary Robotics models (ER [17]) can be particularly
suitable for testing hypotheses concerning both the nature and the evolution
of the underlying mechanisms that underpin the agents’ behaviour. Such mod-
els can be complementary to other analytical modelling tools at the disposal
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of biologists, such as (Evolutionary) Game Theory models (EGT, see [13], for
example). While ER searches for the mechanisms to solve a problem given a fit-
ness function, EGT defines high-level descriptions of any evolutionary process,
useful for objectively identifying the conditions under which certain strategies
can emerge as an evolutionary outcome. Recently, for example, ER models have
contributed to the research on the evolution of communication and cooperation
by proposing a low-level description and mechanisms at the neuronal level to
realise signaling behaviour [12,9,2].
As a basis for our discussion we use the evolution of role allocation and self-
assembling strategies in a group of two homogeneous robots (see [1,26]). The
way in which we address the problem of having the agents coordinate to assume
different roles (who will grip whom) is similar to anti-coordination problems. Co-
ordination and anti-coordination problems are studied by biologists, either by
direct observation of the behaviour of animals, or with the use of analytical mod-
elling tools, as in [14], where “limited-war” type conflicts between conspecifics
are studied. Game theory models allow biologists to predict the outcome of
coordination/anti-coordination problems given the set of behavioural strategies
available to the agent and the payoff corresponding to all the possible combi-
nations of actions among the actors [13,10,22]. However, such analytical tools
may be less suitable for testing hypotheses concerning the nature and the evo-
lution of the underlying mechanisms that underpin the agents’ behaviour. For
example, as noticed by [3], we do not know the exact mechanisms (e.g., rules,
signals and cues) involved in the formation of assembled structures in natural
organisms. Should we assume that agents possess means for explicitly commu-
nicating each other’s “intentions” in order to coordinate their actions? In order
to address such questions, we believe that ER models can be suitable modelling
tools, complementary to other analytical tools at the disposal of biologists.
Potential synergies between ER and EGT models are not limited there. We
believe that the use of population dynamics and EGT provides a clear way of
understanding (and designing) online adaptation and role allocation in popu-
lations of robots—central challenges in most collective robotics problems. This
can provide a solid unified framework for the study of complex self-organized
behavior in populations of robots.
2 Description of the task and the evolutionary process
The task considered is described in detail in [1,26], and can be roughly sum-
marised as follows:
– Two homogeneous robots are initialised at a random distance between a
lower and an upper bound with random initial orientations;
– The robots do not have means for explicit communication;
– The agents should coordinate their movement in order to allocate roles and
connect with each other via the gripping mechanism.
The controllers are evolved in a simulation environment which models some
of the hardware characteristics of the s-bot (a small mobile autonomous robot
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with self-assembling capabilities [15]). Each simulated s-bot is provided with
an omni-directional camera mounted on its turret (see figure 1), returning the
distance to the other s-bot in each of eight 45◦ sectors, up to a distance of
50 cm. The actuators controlled by the neural controller are the two wheels and
the gripper actuator (open/close gripper). Artificial evolution was used to train
networks which are cloned on two homogeneous robots. The network used is a
Continuous Time Recurrent Neural Network (CTRNN [5]), with a feed-forward
architecture, and the evolutionary algorithm used to set the parameters of the
networks is the (µ,λ) evolutionary strategy ((µ,λ)-ES).
The fitness assigned to each genotype after evaluation of the robots behaviour
is the average of the fitness achieved in 40 trials with predefined robot initiali-
sations in order to ensure that successful controllers can cope with a large and
representative sample of all possible initialisations. Notice that this set comprises
both symmetrical and asymmetrical initial conditions, that is, when robots share
the same initial perceptions, or not, respectively. In each trial, a group is re-
warded by the following evaluation function, which assesses the ability of two
robots to approach each other and assemble through the gripper, without dic-
tating the role allocation strategy the robot should use:
F = A ·C · S (1)
A is the aggregation component used for bootstrapping purposes, computed as
follows (with d the robot-robot distance at the end of the trial):
A =
{
1.0
1.0+atan( d−16
16
)
if d > 16 cm;
1.0 otherwise;
(2)
C is the collision component aiming to gradually and smoothly punish collisions
(with n the number of robot-robot collisions), computed as follows:
C =


1.0 if n = 0;
0.0 if n > 20;
1.0
0.5+
√
n
otherwise;
(3)
S is the self-assembly component, computed at the end of a trial as follows (with
K(t) a bootstrapping component):
S =
{
100.0 if robots are assembled;
1.0 +K(t) otherwise;
(4)
3 Successful strategies tested on real robots
One of the evolved neurocontrollers was first extensively tested in simulation
under varying noise conditions to ensure its robustness and its generalisation
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capabilities with respect to various initial conditions. Subsequently, this con-
troller was downloaded to two s-bots, and tested against different environmental
conditions, with a very high success rate (see [1,26]).1
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Fig. 1. Snapshots from a successful trial. (a) Initial configuration. (b) Starting phase.
(c) Role allocation phase. (d) Gripping phase. (e) Success (grip).
For all trials, histories of interactions can be described by transitions between
a few phases which exhaustively “portray” the observed phenomena. The robots
leave their respective starting positions (see figure 1a) and during the starting
phase (see figure 1b) they approach each other. The robots then move from the
starting phase to what we call the role allocation phase (RA-phase, see figure 1c),
in which each s-bot tends to remain on the right side of the other. They slowly
move by following a trajectory corresponding to an imaginary circle centred in
between the s-bots. Moreover, each robot rhythmically changes its heading by
turning left and right. The RA-phase ends once a robot (s-bot -gripper) stops
oscillating and heads towards the other (s-bot -grippee), which instead orients
itself to facilitate the gripping (gripping phase, see figure 1d). The s-bot -gripper
approaches the s-bot -grippee’s turret and grips it. A successful trial terminates
when the robots are connected (see figure 1e).
4 Self-assembly as an anti-coordination game
The results of post-evaluation analyses illustrate that the role allocation is the
result of an autonomous negotiation phase between the robots [1,26]. The out-
come of any action an agent chooses depends on the action of the other and none
of the two agents can predict its final role from its initial perception. According
to [11], in coordination and anti-coordination problems, “two (or more) agents
must choose one of several alternative actions”. The author continues by stress-
ing that “the outcome of any action an agent might choose depends on the action
of the other agents”, as in every frequency dependent process [18]. In [1,26] it is
shown that the system is characterised by two basic operational principles:
– For almost all asymmetrical initial configurations, the experimenter can pre-
dict the result of the role allocation;
1 Videos available at http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/supp/IridiaSupp2008-002
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– For all symmetrical initial configurations, we cannot predict who will grip
whom and the agents assume both roles with 50% probability, as random
noise in sensors/actuators is the element that breaks the symmetry.
This kind of scenario can be described as an anti-coordination problem, in
which the agents have to estimate the strategy of their opponent. If the agents
had the means to directly and precisely access the other’s strategies, the role
allocation would be immediate. However, our agents are deprived of any such
information and must interact to assess and estimate each other’s strategy.
The robots manage to coordinate their actions, “hovering” around the con-
ditions that lead to assuming the s-bot -gripper role (oscillatory movement). The
way the robots solve the anti-coordination problem bears striking similarities
to how animals solve conflicts. In fact, the conflict between two strategies as
attack and flee (or surrender), approach or avoid, is very common in nature. For
example, gulls during fights adopt in turns agonistic (aggressive) postures which
are abandoned as the birds turn broadside to the antagonist. Eventually, one
bird will abandon the offensive and will adopt an appeasement posture or run
away [25]. The similarity of this behaviour with the one of our robots is striking:
it has even been observed that fighting birds walk parallel or around each other,
as our robots circle around each other (see figure 1c). Similar coordination rit-
uals are observed in gulls mating, in the “dance-fighting” observed in the male
starling [7], in the fighting behaviour but also the mating “zig-zag dance” of the
stickleback [24], and in the parallel walks engaged in by red deer stags [6], which
allow for each animal to assess the other’s size and strength and to investigate
possible asymmetries [16]. Parallels can also be drawn between our system and
simultaneous hermaphrodites, as snails, slugs and fish species, where individuals
take single mating decisions (“one-shot” games) that require anti-coordination,
since assuming the same role will end up costly for both [4].
Obviously, the way in which our robots solve the self-assembly task is de-
termined by the way in which we set up our evolutionary process. By isolating
the particular part of the fitness function related with the gripping decision, one
immediately obtains a payoff matrix of a simple anti-coordination game, i.e., a
simple version of the “Hawk-Dove” game2 [13,14]. The fitness function selectively
rewards the robot group to achieve self-assembly: the robots must coordinate to
decide who will grip whom. A failure to take a decision will result in low fitness
scores. The same goes if both robots decide to assume the s-bot -gripper role; the
robots will collide and will be therefore punished by the fitness function. If we
make a simplification and we assume that i) correct role allocation yields the
maximum fitness (100), ii) a failure in the decision-making (with both robots
playing s-bot -gripper) leads to a fitness score of 0, and iii) in case of failure to
allocate the roles during the length of a trial, robots receive just the aggregation
fitness component (A≪ 1), the payoff matrix would be the one in table 1.
Let’s assume that each controller defines an abstract behaviour p, which in
turn defines the probability of choosing to grip or not to grip. From table 1, it
2 This game is based on the principle that the outcome where neither player yields to
the other is the worst possible one for both players.
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Table 1. The payoff matrix of the game our robots are evolved to play. One robot
chooses a strategy from the columns, and the other from the rows. The payoff refers to
the fitness score assigned to the group after the end of the trial. A is the aggregation
component of the fitness function (see equation 2).
s-bot-gripper s-bot-grippee
s-bot-gripper 0 100
s-bot-grippee 100 A
is trivial to see that p = 1/2 is the only evolutionary outcome of this system,
whenever A→ 0. In other words, this problem has only one solution (the action
of every agent is optimal according to what the other agent does): that the
agents should do the opposite of what the other is doing and thus allocate roles.
More specifically, the circular movement with oscillations can be seen as the
sum of two components: assuming the s-bot -gripper role and abandoning it. A
premature decision on behalf of one robot to assume the s-bot -gripper role might
lead to a decision-making error and the robots would end up receiving a fitness
score of 0. Thus, a robot has to assume this role while the other assumes the
s-bot -grippee role. This solution is optimal regardless of the selection type (group
or individual); even if we were using heterogeneous pairs of robots which were
not evaluated collectively but individually, this solution would still be optimal.
Describing the fitness function in game theory terms offers us the opportunity
to view the experiment from a more high-level point of view and to realise that
our experimental setup is very close to an anti-coordination game. This clarifies
the outcome selected by evolution and shows that the solution found is not just
a random one in a possible universe; instead, the principles characterising this
solution could only be the ones they are. Also, this way of looking at our fitness
function after understanding the basic mechanisms underpinning behaviour in
our two robot system helps by providing a more high-level description of our
system, that sometimes may be obscured by the complexity involved in the
effort to break down its behaviour to a set of transparent rules or states.
Furthermore, even if it provides an excellent starting point, it is important to
note that the complexity offered by the above one-shot analysis fails to embrace
the complexity of the online decision process. The reason is twofold: first, robots
do not play mixed strategies, but, instead, reactions to environmental inputs
are preassigned by evolution; second, the online decision process and continu-
ous integration of inputs from the environment, implies not a one-shot game,
but a repeated anti-coordination game, in which more complex strategies can
emerge. This is particularly relevant in the analysis of the case of symmetric
initial configurations. In these cases, robots negotiate on-the-fly their strategies,
as they have the possibility to wait in order to assess the other’s decision and,
at the same time, reshape their own strategy. In order to ease the differentia-
tion and facilitate the convergence to complementary roles, evolution produced
a new strategy characterized by the “dancing” movement (RA-phase, see fig-
ure 1c) which amplifies the effect of noise as a symmetry breaking factor. As
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expected, whenever the same decision process is studied in the absence of noise
(in simulations, not shown) the RA-phase continues indefinitely.
5 Conclusions
We have introduced the idea of the feasibility of ER models as models for biolog-
ical behaviour, complementary to game theory models. Using the game theoret-
ical framework to design the rules of the game, the properties of the interaction
space between agents and the costs and benefits they may share, we can practi-
cally build a fitness function within the ER framework incorporating these rules.
This can be particularly beneficial when identifying the relative importance that
should be given to different fitness components in order to obtain a systematic
evolution of the desired behaviour. Subsequently, artificial evolution can pro-
pose bias-free low-level bechavioural mechanisms instead of high-level strategies
to achieve the solutions to the “game” specified.
In this manuscript, only pairwise interactions were considered. However, both
engineering and biological applications are often characterised by more than two
individuals engaging in coordination and co-existence dilemmas [19]. In this case,
allocation of roles and online social dynamics becomes even more intricate. Fac-
tors such as selection pressure, interaction structure, population size and aver-
age number partners [20,19,8] are known to play decisive roles, making a game
theoretical analysis necessary to understand and design efficient populations of
controllers. Similarly, to achieve coordination of actions, information needs to
be transmitted and properly interpreted. Recent advances in dynamics of sig-
naling and information processing [21,23] are able to capture the most essential
aspects by means of simplified models based in game theory. Hence, also here,
a high level population-based perspective for ER may provide a unified frame-
work for the study of the evolution of communication, filtering, integration and
resultant action. This is an open field of research that can complement the al-
ready present momentum that ER research on the evolution of communication
has generated [12,9,2], offering a novel way of doing robotics, inspired by biology
and population dynamics and less biased by the experimenter.
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